Everything other than one’s character, or rationality, is ultimately indifferent. This is the ideal of the Stoic philosophers that lead them to reject the emotional life. The argument goes something like this:

We should give up the idea that anything matters that is beyond our control. Having control is the most important part of life. One thing we can control is our own character, and we can control that by deciding to be virtuous. We can always control our virtuous character; after all we could be starving to death and still be virtuous. Therefore, all else becomes indifferent: Life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, well-functioning sense organs, wealth, reputation and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, frailty, disablement, poverty, low repute, and ignoble birth. Actually, these positive 'indifferents' were preferred, if circumstances permitted, but ultimately were considered as neither good nor bad.

Emotions as Judgements

For the Stoics, emotions consisted of two different types of judgement. The first judgement being that there is good or bad at hand, and the second judgement concerning the appropriateness to act. Four emotions were selected as being the most generic; distress, pleasure, fear, and appetite. So, in the case of distress, harm is judged to be at hand (in the present) and it is judged appropriate to have a sinking feeling. With pleasure, benefit is judged to be at hand (in the present) and an expansion (of the mind) is felt. With fear, a judgement is made that something bad is at hand (in the future) and it is appropriate to avoid it. With appetite, benefit is at hand (in the future) and it is judged that it should be reached for.

A Rejection of Emotion

The Stoics, however, are persuaded that these judgements (emotions) are actually false. Their reasoning is that part of each judgement presupposes that things are either good or bad. This position clearly contradicts the Stoic theory of indifference outlined above, and so the ideal state that the Stoic sage must aspire to is one that is free from emotions.

Aristotle (384 - 322 BCE) The notion of catharsis

Aristotle’s theory of catharsis was presented in defence of the poets, who had been attacked by Plato in The Republic [1], and banished from the ideal society. Plato believed that the Arts were dangerous because they incited the passions and overshadowed Reason. For Aristotle, stirring up the emotions, far from being dangerous, was actually beneficial in a number of ways:

“We also say that music should be used to procure not one benefit but several. It should be used for education and for catharsis and thirdly as a pastime, to relax us and give us rest from tension.” Politics [2]

The idea here is that through the Arts (music or tragedy for example), the audience will have their emotions roused and any excess of emotion can be expunged. Although the process of emotional catharsis is cross-referenced, in the Politics, to a now lost text, Aristotle hints at the purgative qualities of the process by employing a medical analogy:

“For some people are possessed by this movement, and when they use melodies which make the soul frenzied we see them restored by the sacred melodies as if they got healing and catharsis. All must get a sort of catharsis and be lightened together with pleasure.” Politics [2]

René Descartes (1596-1650): The mind/body problem

Through his sceptical meditations, Descartes was doubtful as to most of the beliefs about the external world we receive through the senses. What is presented to us courtesy of the senses might appear perfectly plain, however, but we might actually be being deceived. Objects in the distance can occasionally deceive us, we could be suffering from hallucinations, we could mistakenly believe we are awake when in fact we are asleep, or we could be being tricked by a wicked demon.

However, this ‘Cartesian doubt’ leads to a conclusion that becomes, for Descartes, certain. ‘No demon could be deceiving me, however wicked and cunning, if I did not exist.’ Put simply the argument runs, cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am).

Mind and body are separate

Descartes was so convinced of the special nature of the mind that he saw it as something separate from the body:

“…although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I, that is, my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it.” Sixth Meditation [3]

Descartes goes on to argue that there is a vast difference between the body and the mind and body in that the former is divisible whereas the latter is indivisible. He is already convinced that as a thinking thing he is whole, entire and indivisible. Conversely, he argues that corporeal things, however small, are always divisible. This, says Descartes, should be argument enough, “this would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already been apprised of it on other grounds.” Sixth Meditation [3]

But what about emotions?

Cartesian dualism runs into difficulties, however, when it tries to explain emotions. If the self is an incorporeal, ‘thinking substance’ entirely distinct from the body, how do we account for the feelings and emotions that seem to be so intertwined with our bodies?

Reason is the slave of the passions - David Hume (1711-1776)6)

Hume’s philosophy of emotions is interesting in that it challenges the high station of reason and questions the inferiority of emotions. In his ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’ Hume devotes the second of three books to the Passions. In Part III, ‘Of The Will and Direct Passions’, Hume summarises the ‘slave/master’ position between reason and emotion, “[n]othing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates.” [4]

Hume sets out to prove that reason, alone, can never be a motive to any action, and that reason can never oppose passion in the direction of the will. He asks us to consider mathematics, mechanics or arithmetic. These arts are useful tools, granted, and they are used in every profession, but of their own they are abstract and demonstrative procedures only, and can never influence our actions. With the prospect of pain or pleasure, Hume argues, reason can only direct the emotions to the relationships between the objects associated with the original emotion. In other words, if we are not affected (indifferent) by objects in the first place, then we cannot know anything about their cause and effect relationships. Hume’s point is that, “as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us." Of The Will and Direct Passions [4]

Similarly, Hume infers that if reason alone cannot produce action then neither can it oppose the passions in the direction of the will. Nothing can oppose the impulse of passion except another, contrary impulse. If this impulse stemmed from reason then reason could have an influence on the will. It must be able to cause as well as block acts of will. However, Hume has already argued that reason alone cannot produce volitions, “[t]hus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense. We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Of The Will and Direct Passions” [4]

Existentialist thought - A Departure from Descartes

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 - 1980)

The main tenets of existentialism include a rejection of Descartes; now the self is thought of as being whole, equivalent with the body, not divided into two (Descartes) or three (Freud) parts. Our existence is defined as not simply being but rather, ‘being in the world’. There is a tendency to emphasise the necessity of the emotions (anguish, despair, anxiety etc.,) as part of the human experience. In addition, existential philosophies all share a common thread in their purpose of project; they are all borne through a reaction against particular paradigms that exclude or marginalise the questions about what it means to be human. These reactions might be against bourgeois “mauvais fois” (bad faith, or self deception), the Victorian ethic or perhaps more radically, against the whole of philosophy. Heidegger believed that all of philosophy had in effect skipped over the question of what it means to ‘be there’. In general, the conclusion drawn is that there is something important about our feelings, emotions and consciousness of consciousness that has been forgotten about by the rest of philosophy. The binding ingredient of existentialism is ultimately subjectivity, and this brings the philosophy into conflict with objective pursuits of knowledge.

The body - Friedrich Nietzshe (1844 - 1900)

For Nietzsche, body and self are one and the same, “Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty lord, an unknown wiseman- whose name is self. In the body he dwelleth, thy body he is.” Here, Nietzsche claims that the self is not separate from but equivalent with the body.

Beings in the world - Heidegger (1889 - 1976)

Our existence is defined as being in the world; we are Beings-in-the-world. This hyphenation, which is found in existential writings, places emphasis on the relationship between the world and the individual. While we certainly have relationships with the objects in the world we also, perhaps more importantly, have relationships with other Beings, or ‘Dasein’ (to be there) to use Heideggerian terminology.

Emotions

Emotional experiences precede the essence of man and make him what he is (this is his essence). Furthermore, they are necessary for us to become truly or authentically human.

Ontological Insecurity - R D Laing (1927 - 1989)

In his book, ‘The Divided Self’ R.D. Laing addresses problems of embodiment from an existential perspective. His basic idea is that patients (particularly schizoids and schizophrenics) suffer from ‘ontological insecurity’. Here, ‘ontological’ is used as an adjective derived from ‘being’. He suggests that patients displaying disembodiment have suffered a fracturing of the Self due to two main causes. Firstly, it is possible that a genetic disposition towards inactivity, or exploration of the world by oneself contributes towards insecurity of Being. Secondly, Laing proposes that an over-protective caregivermother, who smothers the child, prevents the child from consolidating her Being. The two factors exacerbate each other and lead to schizoid or schizophrenic behaviour. According to Laing the insecurity of one’s Being leads to certain anxieties, of which he identifies three types: engulfment, implosion, petrification and depersonalisation.

Engulfment

Engulfment is characterised by a fear of being literally swamped by other people, enveloped by their Being, and therefore, of dying. Obviously, this does not mean dying in the physical or legal sense, but a fear of being existentially dead. As shall become apparent the body becomes separated from the Self and becomes irrelevant to the inner Self.

Implosion

Implosion is an anxiety generated by an emptiness that is felt as a result of ontological insecurity. As the person feels more and more empty, like a void or a vacuum, the more this fear that the world will rush into the vacuum that is the Self and destroy it.

Petrification and Depersonalisation

Petrification, as the name suggests, refers to the fear of being turned, or turning others to stone. That is, the terror of being objectified, made into a machine, an automaton. Depersonalisation is a general term used to denote a refusal to acknowledge the Being of others and in turn to deny one’s own Being.

Laing suggests that as ontological insecurity grows, the patient draws himself inwards towards an inner ‘citadel’ at the expense of everything other than his inner, or core self. This includes his other selves, or ‘false-self system’ and his body. In an attempt to avoid being killed, the individual, existentially, kills himself. This paradox is at the heart of Laing’s work in “The Divided Self”. Anxiety causes the patient to flee from the world and become un-real in order to prevent others from making him un-real. However, the person still wants to be alive and strives to make a connection with the world. This turns out to be very difficult in the face of the onslaught of anxiety that springs from ontological insecurity. Thus we have a position where patients feel that they are not real, where they are not flesh and blood but machines. Laing gives the example of a schizoid who, upon being attacked in an alley, finds the whole situation rather pointless, meaningless. His objection is that the protagonists can hardly hope to gain anything, as he has no money, and they surely cannot hurt him because he is not his body, his inner self has divorced itself from the body and from other Beings around him.

Freud and Repression

Although Sigmund Freud was not a philosopher, his theories and writings amounted to a philosophy of the nature of human beings and have had an enormous impact on western culture. His theories are of particular relevance to emotional processing; he developed the Aristotelian concept of catharsis to a much greater degree, closely linking it to another major concept, repression. Catharsis was regarded as a method of bringing repressed ideas or experiences to consciousness so that underlying tensions may be relieved. Freud developed psychoanalysis, the first type of 'talking cure'. It formed the template for all the major methods of psychological therapy which developed over the 20th century. The many shades of Psychoanalysis, Rogerian Client Centred therapy, Gestalt therapy, Transactional Analysis and many other approaches, have different nuances of theory and interpretation. However, all share the element of helping the patient to talk about, express and explore their problems and conflicts and benefit through the talking. Whilst there are different understandings of how therapy might operate, often a cathartic idea is implied - distressing elements which the patient did not understand are expressed are 'worked through' to the point where the patient feels more at ease and makes sense of their problem.

Brener (1957) suggests that Freud's view of repression was a cornerstone of psychoanalysis.
'Looking back on what he called a simple step (ie positing the existence of repression), one may, as an historian, take the liberty of disputing with Freud's modest characterisation of this momentous hypothesis since in fact it introduced into psychopathology the fundamental theoretical concept that intrapsychic conflict and its consequences were of essential significance in the formation of neurotic symptoms.'

Freud postulated that energy/force/pressure/power was involved in repressing painful memories or threatening ideas.
'We may imagine that what is repressed exercises a continuous straining in the direction of consciousness, so that the balance has to be kept by means of a steady counter pressure. A constant expenditure of energy, therefore, is entailed in maintaining a repression.' (Freud ...)

Catharsis represents a 'release' of this energy, bringing relief and healing. Others have described this (often disparagingly) as a 'hydraulic theory', disagreeing that mental energy can work like water pressure. Freud used many metaphors to describe the operation of psychic energy - pressure, balance, energy, force, resistance. He was strongly influenced by Helmholtz's formulation of the principle of the conservation of energy which states that energy in a physical system is always constant and cannot be changed; as energy changes in one part of the system it inevitably effects other parts of the system. Freud was the first to apply these ideas to the human psyche as a useful metaphor. In his project for Scientific Psychology (1895) he had abandoned the attempt to reduce psychological phenomena to literal physiological processes so he was not suggesting the brain literally works hydraulically. The hydraulic metaphor has been simplified and debased in the media to a folklore belief that if any emotion is 'bottled up' the pressure will ruin our health.

Emotional processing, like much of psychotherapy, is influenced by Freud's notions of repression, catharsis and the blocking and transforming of psychological energy, though it does not rest on a psychoanalytical model.

References

Dorset RDSU
Cornelia House Poole Hospital NHS Trust Longfleet Road Poole Dorset BH15 2JB
Email dawn.stevens@poole.nhs.uk